Working papers
!!!new!!!
Dual Reductions and the First-Order Approach for Informationally Robust Mechanism Design
with Songzi Du!!!new!!!
Participation-Adaptive Pricing
with Songzi Du and Linchen Zhang!!!new!!!
Robust Predictions with Bounded Information
with Songzi Du and Alexander HabermanOn the Alignment of Consumer Surplus and Total Surplus under Competitive Price Discrimination
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisRobust Mechanisms for the Financing of Public Goods
with Songzi DuMaxmin Auction Design with Known Expected Values
with Songzi DuCompetition and Public Information: A Note
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisInformationally Robust Optimal Auction Design
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisA "Pencil Sharpening" Algorithm for Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring
with Dilip Abreu and Yuliy SannikovRelated software
Surveying and Selling: Belief and Surplus Extraction in Auctions
Revenue Sharing in Second-Price Auctions
Publications
The Limits of Price Discrimination
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisAmerican Economic Review, 2015
Online appendix
First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisEconometrica, 2017
Online appendix
An earlier version with discrete values.
An even earlier version with additional results on binary values.
Cultural Impediments to Learning to Cooperate: An Experimental Study of High- and Low-Caste Men in Rural India
with Karla Hoff and Priyanka PandeyPNAS, 2018
An earlier version
Revenue guarantee equivalence
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisAmerican Economic Review, 2019
Algorithms for Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring
with Dilip Abreu and Yuliy SannikovEconometrica, 2020
Online appendix
Supplemental appendix
Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisTheoretical Economics, 2020
Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach
with Songzi DuEconometrica, 2021
Search, Information, and Prices
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisJournal of Political Economy, 2021
Counterfactuals with Latent Information
with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. MorrisAmerican Economic Review, 2022
Information Hierarchies
with Alexander Frankel and Emir KamenicaEconometrica, 2022
A Canonical Game – 75 Years in the Making – Showing the Equivalence of Matrix Games and Linear Programming
with Phil RenyEconomic Theory Bulletin, 2023
Comparisons of Signals
with Alexander Frankel and Emir KamenicaAmerican Economic Review, 2024
On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms
with Songzi DuEconometrica, 2024