Ben Brooks

Department of Economics
University of Chicago

babrooks@uchicago.edu (email)

Working papers


!!!new!!! 

Participation-Adaptive Pricing

with Songzi Du and Linchen Zhang

!!!new!!! 

Robust Predictions with Bounded Information

with Songzi Du and Alexander Haberman

!!!updated!!! 

On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms

with Songzi Du

!!!new!!! 

On the Alignment of Consumer Surplus and Total Surplus under Competitive Price Discrimination

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris

Robust Mechanisms for the Financing of Public Goods

with Songzi Du

Comparisons of Signals

with Alexander Frankel and Emir Kamenica

Maxmin Auction Design with Known Expected Values

with Songzi Du

Competition and Public Information: A Note

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris

A "Pencil Sharpening" Algorithm for Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring

with Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov
Related software

Surveying and Selling: Belief and Surplus Extraction in Auctions

Revenue Sharing in Second-Price Auctions



Publications

The Limits of Price Discrimination

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
American Economic Review, 2015
Online appendix

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
Econometrica, 2017
Online appendix
An earlier version with discrete values.
An even earlier version with additional results on binary values.

Cultural Impediments to Learning to Cooperate: An Experimental Study of High- and Low-Caste Men in Rural India

with Karla Hoff and Priyanka Pandey
PNAS, 2018
An earlier version

Revenue guarantee equivalence

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
American Economic Review, 2019

Algorithms for Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring

with Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov
Econometrica, 2020
Online appendix
Supplemental appendix

Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
Theoretical Economics, 2020

Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach

with Songzi Du
Econometrica, 2021

Search, Information, and Prices

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
Journal of Political Economy, 2021

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen E. Morris
American Economic Review, 2022

Information Hierarchies

with Alexander Frankel and Emir Kamenica
Econometrica, 2022

A Canonical Game – 75 Years in the Making – Showing the Equivalence of Matrix Games and Linear Programming

with Phil Reny
Economic Theory Bulletin, 2023